Looking Beyond the Border: The Sino-Indian Border Dispute and Sino-Indian Relations by Lu, Yang
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Heidelberg Papers 
 
in South Asian 
 
and Comparative Politics  
 
 
 
South Asia Inst i tute
Department of Poli t ical  Science
Universi ty of  Heidelberg
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Looking Beyond the Border:  
The Sino-Indian Border Dispute and  
Sino-Indian Relations 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
Yang Lu 
 
 
Working Paper No. 31 
 
August 2007
         YANG LU 
HEIDELBERG PAPERS OF SOUTH ASIA AND  
COMPARATIVE POLITICS 
ISSN: 1617-5069 
 
About HPSACP 
This occasional paper series is run by the Department of Political Science of the 
South Asia Institute at the University of Heidelberg. The main objective of the 
series is to publicise ongoing research on South Asian politics in the form of 
research papers, made accessible to the international community, policy makers 
and the general public. HPSACP is published only on the Internet. The papers are 
available in the electronic pdf-format and are designed to be downloaded at no cost 
to the user. 
The series draws on the research projects being conducted at the South Asia 
Institute in Heidelberg, senior seminars by visiting scholars and the world-wide 
network of South Asia scholarship. The opinions expressed in the series are those 
of the authors, and do not represent the views of the University of Heidelberg or 
the Editorial Staff. 
 
Potential authors should consult the style sheet and list of already published papers 
at the end of this article before making a submission. 
 
 
Editor    Subrata K. Mitra 
 
Deputy Editors            Malte Pehl 
Jivanta Schöttli 
Siegfried Wolf 
 
Editorial Assistant   Anja Kluge 
 
Editorial Consultants      Katharine Adeney 
Mike Enskat 
Alexander Fischer 
Karsten Frey 
Evelin Hust 
Karl-Heinz Krämer 
Apurba Kundu 
Peter Lehr 
Kenneth McPherson 
Marie-Thérèse O’Toole 
Matthias Paukert 
Christian Wagner 
Clemens Spieß 
Wolfgang-Peter Zingel 
H E I D E L B E R G  P A P E R S  I N  S O U T H  A S I A N  A N D  C O M P A R A T I V E  
P O L I T I C S  
h t t p : / / w w w . s a i . u n i - h e i d e l b e r g . d e / S A P O L / H P S A C P . h t m  
W o r k i n g  P a p e r  N o .  3 1 ,  A u g u s t  2 0 0 7  
 
2 
         YANG LU 
 
 
 
 
 
Looking Beyond the Border: 
The Sino-Indian Border Dispute and Sino-
Indian Relations 
 
Y A N G  L U  
 
South Asia Institute, University of Heidelberg1
 
 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM  
 
As the two most populous nations and Asia’s two largest and most dynamic 
societies, China and India have become the world’s most important economies and 
their participation and influence in regional and world affairs has increased over 
time. However, the relationship between the two Asian giants has not been an easy 
one. The border dispute, a colonial legacy, has existed since the very beginning of 
the relationship between the two new nation-states, established at the end of the 
1940s.2 Their relationship reached its climax in the mid 1950s, but soon 
deteriorated in the face of the border dispute. In 1962, a short and limited war 
broke out, causing the Indo-China relationship to enter the deep freeze. The border 
question was a major barrier to the development of Sino-Indian relations 
throughout the whole of the 1960s and 1970s. By 1981, India and China had finally 
returned to the negotiation table. Since then, border negotiation has passed through 
three different stages, marked by the eight rounds of Border Talks at vice-
ministerial level, the Joint Working Group (JWG) on the border issue, and the 
ongoing Special Representatives’ meetings. The border issue is one of the most 
protracted and complicated problems between the two countries. It is like a mirror, 
reflecting the ebbs and flows of the relationship between India and China. It does 
not stand alone but is related to many other bilateral and international issues. Each 
time other events block the relationship, the border negotiations are also prevented 
from making any progress. Hence, I have chosen the border dispute as a starting 
point from which to develop my research inquiry into the Sino-Indian relations. I 
explore the role of the border dispute between India and China from a negotiation 
perspective, and within a constructivist framework, by emphasising ideational 
                                                 
1 Yang Lu (M.A.)  is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at the South 
Asia Institute, University  of  Heidelberg. E-mail: ylu@ix.urz.uni-heidelberg.de. 
2  India’s independence was achieved on August 15, 1947; the establishment of People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) occurred on October 1, 1949.  
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factors in the decision-making process. I divide the Sino-Indian border dispute into 
two distinct stages, conflict escalation and conflict de-escalation, in order to 
achieve this goal. I also place a focus on border trade and on the newly built 
Qinghai-Tibet Railway which are both supposed to have played a significant role in 
enhancing people-to-people contact along the border. After exploring the ripeness 
of an ultimate settlement of the border dispute, I conclude that there is no winner or 
loser from an historical and holistic perspective and that both parties have won and 
lost in different aspects. Now is the time to test the wisdom of the political leaders 
in finding a mutually acceptable solution. The crucial basis of a healthy 
relationship is the enhancement of mutual trust between the two countries, which 
could be promoted by institution-building at the bilateral and multilateral levels.  
 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Negotiation is the principal means of handling all international disputes by 
peaceful means.3 Some scholars conceive of negotiation as a process that runs 
through stages, in which the outcome is explained by the performance of behaviour 
identified as specifically appropriate to each successive stage.4 For a depiction of 
the stages see Figure 1. One of the keys to successful conflict resolution lies in the 
timing of efforts for resolution.5 A specific aspect of timing is “ripeness,” which is 
a necessary but not sufficient condition for the initiation of negotiations.6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      Figure 1 Negotiation Stages  
 
[By Brahm, Eric (2003). 
http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/negotiation_stage/] 
                                                 
3 For an introduction to international negotiation see Starkey (1999). On the techniques and 
practice of international negotiation see Iklé (1964). For discussion of the cultural aspects 
of negotiation see Cohen (1991), Faure & Sjöstedt (1993).  
4 See Gulliver (1979), Zartman & Berman (1982).  
5 One could also identify a third school, see Lederach (1997), Sampson (1997), and Kelman 
(1997), that focuses on relationships between the parties.  
6 See Zartman (2000), pp. 227-230. 
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 According to William Zartman’s approach of understanding ripeness, two 
elements are important for a ripe moment: the parties’ perception of a mutually 
hurting stalemate (MHS) and the perception of “a way out” (the possibility of a 
negotiated solution). His approach centres on the perception of the parties: an MHS 
contains objective and subjective elements, but only the latter are necessary and 
sufficient to its existence.7 In my analysis I will regard the border dispute between 
China and India as a process of negotiation which consists of different successive 
stages and will attempt to identify the ripe moments in the negotiation process. 
       Constructivism takes up the arguments of sociological theory to explain 
International Relations (IR). Broadly understood, a constructivist approach in IR 
would base its explanation of a state’s behaviour on the state elites’ self-
understanding about state identities and the nature of threat.8 Here, ideas – such as 
knowledge, beliefs, rules, and norms – play an important role in the decision-
making process of politicians. One of the most cited contributions of 
Constructivism is the “agent-structure problem” revealed by Alexander Wendt.9 
Agents as actors are seen as being capable of making a difference in and changing 
the social systems. Structures are social relationships embedded into social systems 
and shape the behaviour of actors within those systems.10 Taking the concepts of 
structuration theory proposed by Anthony Giddens,11 Wendt attempted to 
conceptualize the relationship between agents (states) and structures (the structure 
of international system) and discussed agency and structural determination in 
international politics: structures contain ideational and material elements, as well as 
practice; agents and structures are mutually constituted and co-determined; agents 
can create and possibly transform structures as a result of their agency.12 
According to the Constructivist view, the meaning and construction of material 
reality is dependent on ideas and interpretation. Constructivists take states’ 
identities seriously and regard inter-subjective or cultural understandings of a 
conflict situation as important determinants of state behaviour. In the international 
system, before actors can choose a course of action, they need to define the 
situation. These definitions will be based on at least two considerations: their own 
identities and interests, which reflect beliefs about who they are in such situations; 
and what they think others will do, which reflect beliefs about others’ identities and 
interests. For example, in the bilateral structure of the Cold War, the US and 
Soviets held a shared belief that they were enemies, which helped constitute their 
                                                 
7 Ibid. 
8 See Katzenstein (1996), Wendt (1999). 
9 Other influential scholars in establishing the theoretical orientation of Constructivism are 
John Ruggie, Richard Ashley, Friedrich Kratochwil.  
10 Social structure is a term which is frequently used in social theory. For more on social 
structure see Blau (1975), Porpora (1987, 1989), Lopez & Scott (2000).  
11 The concept of structuration has been proposed by Anthony Giddens. Structuration 
theory is an attempt to reconcile theoretical dichotomies of social systems such as agency 
and structure, subjective and objective, and micro and macro perspectives. See Giddens 
(1984, 1987). 
12 See Wendt (1999). 
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identities and interests in any given situation, and upon which they in turn acted in 
ways that confirmed to the other that they were a threat, thus, reproducing the 
structure of the Cold War. Hence, identities of actors and their corresponding 
interests are learned and then reinforced in response to how actors are treated by 
others.13 How actors perceive the world is important in explaining their actions. In 
terms of the Constructivist approach, my analysis will centre on the perception of 
state elites, on their understanding of state identities and interests in the decision 
making process.  
 
FROM CONFLICT ESCALATION TO HURTING STALEMATE 
 
The Border Conflict 
The Sino-Indian border is generally divided into the eastern, middle and western 
sectors (see Map 1). The conflict is mainly over the western sector and eastern 
sector. On the western sector there is the ongoing dispute over the Aksai Chin 
plateau, which, on its three sides, faces Ladakh (in Indian-administered Kashmir), 
Tibet, and Xinjiang. India claims Aksai Chin as part of Ladakh and China claims it 
as part of Xinjiang. Between Bhutan and Burma lies the eastern sector which 
involves a dispute over the area between the pre-1914 British Outer Line and the 
McMahon Line. This is the Assam Himalayan region, which is claimed by India as 
being part of the state of Arunachal Pradesh – formerly the North-East Frontier 
Agency (NEFA) of Assam and claimed by China as part of Tibet.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                        Map 1 The Sino-Indian Frontier [Liu (1994), p. 16.] 
 
                                                 
13 Ibid., pp. 186-187. 
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The middle sector involves a dispute over various points on the border between 
Indian-administered Kashmir and Nepal. The McMahon Line in the eastern sector 
and Aksai Chin in the western sector have been central to the Sino-Indian border 
dispute. Today the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the eastern sector conforms to 
the McMahon Line, the disputed area covering a total area of 90,000 square 
kilometres. In the western sector the LAC runs roughly along the Karakoram 
Range, conforming to the Chinese claim. The disputed area covers a total of about 
33,000 square kilometres.14  
      The origin of the Sino-Indian border dispute was very well summarized by 
Neville Maxwell: “British power in India expanded,…until it reached the great 
retaining arc of the Himalaya. There it came into contact with another, that of 
China. In the central sector of the frontier zone, where lay petty states and 
feudatories, there began a contest for dominance over these marcher lands that 
continues to the present day. In the north-west and the north-east, where no minor, 
independent polities existed to act as buffers, the British sought secure and settled 
boundaries with China: these they failed to achieve, and the failure was to lead in 
the middle of the twentieth century to the border war between India and China.”15 
The Tibet question had been intertwined in the border dispute since the very 
beginning. The British view that Tibet is a buffer zone between India and China 
formed the territorial perception of the Indian government after Independence. 
When China asserted its sovereignty over Tibet in 1950, which fundamentally 
altered the geo-politics of the region, India’s perceived threat horizons were 
changed and the vital question of where the territorial limits of the newly founded 
Indian state lay was raised. On the eastern sector, India based her claims on the 
McMahon Line, a line that successive Chinese governments have never accepted 
since the day it was made, and which the British marked as “Un-demarcated” on 
maps when they left. On the western sector, which the British marked as 
“Boundary Undefined,” India included the Aksai Chin Plateau into her territory. 
However, China also regarded Aksai Chin as hers, based on the maps of previous 
Chinese governments. From 1953-54, India and China held negotiations over 
India’s extra-territorial rights in Tibet, which it had inherited from the period of 
British rule. In April 1954, India and China signed the Agreement on Trade and 
Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India. Under this Agreement, 
India gave up all of its privileges in Tibet and recognized Chinese sovereignty 
there. At the same time, the Indian Prime Minister, Nehru, and the Chinese 
Premier, Chou, enunciated the famous Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,16 
also known as Panchsheela, which were included in the preamble of the 
agreement. From 1954 onwards, the relations between China and India were 
dominated by a spirit of brotherhood and mutual support. However, this 
                                                 
14 See Liu (1994). For a more detailed explanation and exploration of the history of the 
Sino-Indian border see also Lamb (1964), Maxwell (1970), Woodman (1969), Hoffman 
(1990).  
15 See Maxwell (1970), p. 19. 
16 These five principles are: 1. Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and 
sovereignty; 2. Non-aggression; 3. Non-interference in each other’s national affairs; 4. 
Equality and mutual benefit; 5. Peaceful coexistence.  
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relationship did not last very long. After the agreement, the Indian Government 
altered its official maps, thus their differences on the border issue gained open 
expression on their official maps, and inevitably led to constant conflicts on the 
border area. 
The year 1959 was a turning point in Sino-Indian relations. In this year, the 
Tibetan rebellion17 and the Longju and Konka Pass Incidents18 broadened the level 
and degree of hostility in an already deteriorating relationship. With the publication 
of the correspondence between the two Governments over the border issue in the 
form of a White Paper in September 1959, the dispute with China was opened to 
the public and raised strong nationalist sentiment in India. The Sino-Indian 
relations reached its lowest point since 1947. Efforts were made to negotiate the 
border. However, India would agree only to discussions on the marginal 
adjustment of the alignments she claimed, after China had accepted these in 
principle; and before these discussions could begin, Chinese personnel had to be 
withdrawn from all territory claimed by India.19 China could not accept these 
conditions. Thus, the efforts towards negotiation failed. In late 1961, Indian patrols 
began to move into the territory that China held in the western sector. This was the 
beginning of the so-called Forward Policy. In 1962, India’s Forward Policy on the 
Sino-Indian border entered a new provocative and offensive phase, with Indian 
troops setting up as many posts as possible in the disputed area in the eastern and 
western sectors. At the same time, Indian domestic political resistance to even the 
idea of opening discussions with China hardened further. For China, if India 
continued its Forward Polity, the result would be that China lost the territory and, 
consequently, effective control over Tibet, or that armed conflicts would never end 
on the borders. Both scenarios were unacceptable to China. Furthermore, the 
difficult economic and political situation of China did not permit unending armed 
conflicts. On the early morning of 20 October 1962, a massive attack from Chinese 
troops began along the entire border. India was militarily unprepared and taken by 
surprise. After a remarkable advance, China halted and declared a unilateral 
ceasefire on 20 November 1962. By the eve of the 1962 border conflict, China 
controlled most of the western sector and India had secured its control on the 
eastern sector. This reality did not change after the conflict. The Line of Actual 
Control became the de facto boundary between India and China.  
 
Ideational Factors Leading to the 1962 Conflict 
If we regard the whole border dispute as a negotiation process including different 
stages, the period from the early 1950s up until the border war in 1962 was 
dominated by conflict escalation. Within this process, the inter-related ideational 
factors help us to understand the essence of the border conflict.  
                                                 
17 The 14th Dalai Lama and his followers fled to India to seek political asylum. China 
suspected that the Indian Government was supporting the subversive activities in Tibet.  
18 The Longju and Konka Pass Incidents are the first two armed clashes on the eastern and 
western sector respectively. Some comments about these two incidents see Hoffman 
19 For details about the proposals by the two Prime Ministers see White Paper 3, pp. 45-50. 
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The main actors, India and China, were constrained by the structure of the 
international system, that is, the Cold War. Their relationship changed during the 
process of systemic interaction. Decision-makers formulated strategies to direct the 
states’ behaviours based on their understandings of their state’s interests and 
identities. For decision-makers in both countries, the bipolar structure of the 
international system was a reference point in defining the identities and interests of 
states, according to which they could then define their positions and roles in the 
world system. Such identities and their related interests were to influence the 
strategies that were chosen during the Sino-Indian border conflict. In addition, the 
world views of the decision-makers also had an influence on decision-making. 
Contrary traditions in the political systems of India and China led to different 
world views of the respective political leaders. The political leaders in China, 
represented by Mao, regarded China as a state injured by the aggression and 
intervention of the imperialist powers of the past. Therefore, the birth of a new 
China symbolized a break with a humiliating past. In the arena of diplomacy, the 
basic principles for China in their dealings with other states were non-interference 
in each other’s internal affairs, equal, mutual benefit, and mutual respect for 
sovereignty and territorial integrity,20 reflecting the moral world in which China 
would like its diplomacy to be perceived. These principles were later developed 
and complemented as the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence (Panchsheela) 
in the 1954 Agreement with India. Based on these principles, the legacies of 
imperialist aggression needed to be corrected or rectified through international 
conventions. However, the Five Principles for China did not necessarily rule out 
the use of war. Contrary to China, the leaders in India, represented by Nehru, did 
not envisage a sharp qualitative break between the past and the present, between 
the territorial space and institutions of British India and those of independent India. 
Hence, all British territorial claims and interests were regarded as India’s legitimate 
inheritance and were to be secured.21 Nehru believed that the Forward Policy 
would not lead to war; it could only spark off sporadic border clashes.22 While 
China was under pressure from the Soviet Union for a peaceful solution, according 
to China’s identity in the socialist camp, China was not likely to launch a war that 
would cause its relationship with the Soviet Union to deteriorate. It is regretful that 
Mao’s strategy was not as transparent as it should have been under the Chinese 
ideological propaganda and their Marxist-Leninist mode of analysis,23 leading to a 
misjudgement on the Indian side which heightened misperceptions. This has also 
led to scholars linking the Chinese attack with the worsening Sino-Soviet 
                                                 
20 See The Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference 
(September 29, 1949), chapter 7, Foreign Policies. This Common Program served as a 
temporary constitution of China until September 20, 1954. 
21 See Liu (1994), p. 80. 
22 See Bhattacharjea (2001), p. 440. 
23 See two editorial articles of the People’s Daily: “Revolution in Tibet and Nehru’s 
Philosophy” (May 6, 1959), and “More on Nehru’s Philosophy in the light of the Sino-
Indian boundary” (October 27, 1962). These articles reflected Mao’s understandings of 
world revolution with specific references to “Indian bourgeois nationalism” under Nehru.  
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relations.24 However, the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, which stemmed 
from the countries’ different approaches to world revolution, was contextual factor 
and not essential and necessary factor that led to the 1962 border conflict. The 
essential factor was the identity crisis generated by the challenge to each country's 
territory. In terms of the constructivist view, the identity of a state implies its 
interests. India and China are both nation-states based on the Westphalian state 
principle which prescribes territory, sovereignty, and international legitimacy as 
the three basic constitutive dimensions of any modern state,25 hence, it could be 
concluded that sovereign control, territorial integrity and security are essential 
interests at the core of maintaining the identities of India and China as national 
states. The threat to their borders, was a threat to their very statehood and thus led 
to an identity crisis of the state. This situation provoked a strong nationalism in 
both India and China, which, by September 1962, had escalated to a point where 
military engagement from both sides was inevitable. The 1962 border conflict was 
in fact a clash of nationalism over the Himalayan frontiers. 
 
The Mutually Hurting Stalemate 
Ripeness comprises two elements: a mutually hurting stalemate, and a sense of a 
way out. After the 1962 conflict, the bilateral relationship of India and China 
entered into a frozen state in which neither side was able to win and was thus 
prepared to make concessions. This phase lasted about ten years until the beginning 
of the 1970s, when both sides were being harmed by the continuing confrontation.  
The two states not only began to ally with each other’s adversaries – China 
with Pakistan, and India with the Soviet Union, thereby, undermining each other 
strategically, but also began to support those internal forces hostile to one another. 
The Dalai Lama was allowed to establish his exiled government in North India, and 
some Indian politicians actively supported the movement for Tibet’s independence. 
On the Chinese side, the Chinese Government offered support to insurgent groups 
like the Nagas and Mizos in India’s Northeast, as well as the Naxalbari movement 
in the north of West Bengal. On the Sino-Indian border, although there were no 
major armed clashes occurred after 1962, alleged incidents violating the Line of 
Actual Control took place frequently and the tension did not ease. Economic 
relations were suspended at the beginning of the 1960s. From 1962-1976, except in 
1964, the trade volume reached $270, 000, and in the other years, there was no 
trade between the two countries.26 In June 1967, a diplomatic crisis broke out. 
China announced the expulsion of two Indian diplomats from Beijing on espionage 
charges, and withdrew their diplomatic status, opening a public trial. In retaliation, 
the Indian Government deprived two Chinese diplomats of their diplomatic status 
and deported them. On 16 June 1967, some Chinese embassy personnel were 
assaulted and injured by Indian demonstrators in front of the Chinese embassy in 
New Delhi. In Beijing, Chinese Red Guards besieged the Indian embassy and 
blocked all the roads to the Indian embassy. This diplomatic crisis ended on 20-21 
                                                 
24 See Raganathan & Khanna (2000), pp. 13-24. 
25 See Vasquez (1993), Agnew & Corbridge (1995), Krasner (1999). 
26 Almanac of China Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (1984), 4, p. 17.  
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June, when both sides lifted the sieges on the two embassies. These incidents 
further damaged Sino-Indian relations.27  
Constrained by the Cold War, their interests were deeply involved in the 
superpower rivalry, and each country profited through alliances in order to enhance 
its position in the confrontation. However, the dispute was not ripe for negotiation, 
because the signs for a “sense of a way out” had not emerged.  
 
CONFLICT DE-ESCALATION 
 
Sense of a Way Out 
At the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s some significant moves had 
taken place to reverse the worsening relations. The top leaders of India and China 
had expressed their will to resume bilateral relations. On 1 January 1969, Indian 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi stated in a press conference that the Indian 
Government would be prepared to try to find a way of solving the dispute with 
China through talks without any pre-conditions.28 In another message to China, she 
said during an interview to a journalist in the same month: “To be frank, the 
Chinese are not an emotional people, so to some extent relations depend on the 
world situation. My own way of looking at this problem is that no position is static. 
No two countries could have been more hostile than America and China, yet they 
are willing to have a dialogue and even conservative Americans think that a 
dialogue is necessary.”29 The Chinese responded positively to Mrs. Gandhi’s 
message. On 1 May 1970, when Mao met diplomatic representatives at the podium 
of Tiananmen Square, Mao shook hands with the Indian charge d’ affaires, Brajesh 
Mishra,30 and told him, “India is a great country. The Indian people are a great 
people. Chinese and Indian people ought to live as friends, they cannot always 
quarrel.”31 Mishra was authorized to respond that India would be prepared to open 
a dialogue with China and conveyed the decision of the Indian Government to send 
an Ambassador to China. Mrs Gandhi and Mao’s words, exchanged in public, 
could be seen as early signs of a thaw between India and China. However, some of 
the subsequent events interrupted this process. India moved closer to the Soviet 
Union, as Mrs. Gandhi saw the threat of the emerging China-Pakistan-US triangle. 
India signed the Indo-Soviet Treaty and dismembered Pakistan in the third Indo-
Pakistan War in 1971, thereby establishing its status as a regional power in South 
Asia. China regarded the Indo-Soviet Treaty as being directed against itself and 
Pakistan. Also in the same year, India enhanced its administrative control in the 
Northeast, declaring NEFA as a centrally administered area named Arunachal 
Pradesh. Moreover, Sikkim was made a state of India in 1974 through a 
constitution amendment. China strongly protested against India’s actions in the 
NEFA and Sikkim. Thus, during 1971-75, the cold relations between India and 
                                                 
27 See Liu (1994), p. 115, Zhang (2004), p. 26. 
28 The Times of India (January 2, 1969). 
29 Hindustan Times (January 24, 1969). 
30 In July 1961 India withdrew its ambassador, one year later, the Chinese ambassador left       
his position as well. The bilateral relationship was dropped to a charge d’ affaires level.  
31 See Wang (1998), p. 302. 
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China remained, but the desire for a better bilateral relationship continued. In 1976, 
both sides finally reached a consensus to restore ambassadorial-level relations. 
Mrs. Gandhi appointed K. R. Narayanan as Indian ambassador to Beijing, the first 
after two decades. He took up his assignment in Beijing in July 1976 and soon 
after, China also posted its ambassador in Delhi. The exchange of ambassadors 
suggested that relations had emerged out of the deep freeze and entered a period of 
détente. 
 
Border Negotiation 
The deep mistrust between the two nations, caused by the 1962 conflict, was the 
largest hurdle to developing their relations. Hence, as the leaders on both sides 
decided to improve Sino-Indian relations, the opening of border negotiations was 
soon put on the agenda by the two governments. By now three institutions had 
been established to negotiate the border.  
The first institution for Indo-China border negotiations were the eight rounds 
of border talks at the vice-ministerial level, held annually in Beijing and New Delhi 
alternately from 1981 to 1987. Although eight rounds of official-level talks failed 
to achieve any breakthrough on the border issue, these talks still had their 
significance. Firstly, after a prolonged interruption in India-China relations, these 
talks allowed a friendly and candid exchange of views and enhanced mutual 
understanding between the two governments. The dialogue itself eased tensions 
and helped to shape a negotiated solution acceptable to both sides. In addition, 
through official channels, both sides explored the exchange and cooperation in the 
areas of economy, trade, culture, science and technology, and the possibility of a 
corresponding mechanism. Official, semi-official and unofficial exchange 
increased markedly during this period. 
The JWG on the border was another institution of Indo-China border 
negotiation. Its establishment was fostered by the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv 
Gandhi's visit to China between 19-23 December 1988. The JWG replaced the 
border talks at the vice-ministerial level to continue negotiation on the border 
question between Indian and China. Between 1989 and 1997, the JWG met for ten 
rounds of talks in Beijing and New Delhi alternately.32 The most significant 
progress made in this period are two agreements. One was the Agreement on 
Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control 
(LAC), signed in September 1993 during the visit of Indian Prime Minister 
Narasimha Rao to China. This agreement emphasizes that the boundaries question 
should be resolved through consultation and collective efforts. The two sides were 
instructed to respect and observe the LAC strictly before the border issue was 
settled, and each side should keep respective military forces in the areas along the 
LAC to a minimum level. Neither side would use force or threaten to use force 
against the other, nor undertake specified levels of military exercises in mutually 
identified zones. The Agreement envisaged the working out of effective confidence 
building measures (CBMs) in the area along the LAC, and stipulated the solution 
                                                 
32 For more on detailed negotiating process of the JWG meetings of 1992 and 1993 see 
memoirs of former Indian Foreign secretary J. N. Dixit (1995), pp. 229-252. 
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of any contingencies and problems that might arise along the LAC. Furthermore, 
each side of the JWG was to appoint diplomatic and military experts, their task 
being to advise the JWG on matters such as the formulation of implementation 
measures, and the resolution of differences on the alignment, redeployment and 
reduction of military forces. This agreement was a big step forward in exploring a 
border solution and towards eliminating the possibility of military crises such as 
the Sumdorung Chu crisis of 1986-1987.33  
The other key agreement was the Agreement on Confidence Building 
Measures in the Military field along the Line of Actual Control, signed in 
December 1996 when the Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited India. The 1996 
Agreement went into very great detail about the reduction of military forces, the 
limiting of tension and dangerous military activities, and discussed the 
strengthening of exchanges and cooperation between their military personnel in 
various ways, such as establishing scheduled and flag meetings. As an initial step 
towards a border settlement, the difficult and ongoing technical task of clarifying 
the LAC was very useful. The Agreement also discussed the clarification of the 
LAC with the two sides acknowledging the need to arrive at a common 
understanding of the alignment of the LAC, and to speed up the process of 
clarification and confirmation of the line. The segments in which both sides had 
different perceptions needed first to be clarified. Both sides agreed to exchange 
maps indicating their respective perceptions of the alignment of LAC as soon as 
possible. 
The third institution has taken the form of the Special Representatives’ 
Meeting. It was established during Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee’s visit to China 
in June 2003. Marked by the conclusion of the Declaration on Principles for 
Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation between India and China, his visit 
opened a new phase in Sino-Indian relations. The Special Representatives-level 
talks and the JWG’s work do not preclude each other.34 The JWG deals with the 
technical aspects of the border question such as the clarification of the LAC and the 
implementation of CBMs,35 while the Special Representatives’ Meeting discuss the 
question at a political level. The major achievement of the Meetings is the 
Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement 
of the Border Question which was signed during Chinese Prime Minister Wen 
Jiabao’s visit to India in April 2005. At present, the objective of the Special 
Representatives’ Meeting is to work out an agreed framework for the resolution of 
                                                 
33 In 1984, the Intelligence Bureau of India opened a post in the Sumdurong valley, which 
lies in the Tagla ridge north of the McMahon Line and is thus considered by China as its 
territory. In mid-June 1986, China reoccupied the valley when the Indian detachment left 
their post for Nyamjang Chu in order to collect their salaries and rations. India condemned 
the Chinese action on 15 July 1986, with China answering that it was India that had 
violated and crossed the LAC. Both sides deployed their armies on the border region. See 
Sawhney (2002), p. 29, Zhao (2000), p. 291.  
34 See http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2125/stories/20041217001205500.htm, “On the 
Right Track,” by P.S. Suryanarayana, Frontline 21(25) (online edition, December 04-17, 
2004).  
35 See The Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation 
between the Republich of India and the People’s Republic of China (June 23, 2003). 
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the boundary based on the agreed political parameters and guiding principles. This 
framework will provide the basis for the delineation and demarcation of the India-
China boundary.  
 
Ideational Factors Leading to Negotiation 
The conflict de-escalation of the border dispute needs to be situated in the de-
freezing process of Indo-Chinese bilateral relations. Mrs. Gandhi and Mao’s desire 
to improve bilateral relations at the beginning of the 1970s indicated the change of 
perceptions on the part of the political leaders in the Sino-Indian relationship. 
Although both sides had realized that good relations with each other was in 
accordance with their national interests, constrained by the Cold War structure, the 
relationship between India and China improved at a very slow pace between the 
mid-1970s and the mid-1980s. Between 1989 and 1991, the collapse of 
Communism in Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet Union heralded 
the end of the Cold War. This represented a dramatic turning point in the structures 
of international politics. The Soviet Union, as the key international factor 
preventing better relations between China and India, was now removed. With the 
bipolar structure of the international system collapsing, states began to redefine 
their identities and interests. Going back to the negotiation table was in China and 
India’s interests in the new situation.  
Today India and China are making efforts at adapting themselves to the 
process of globalization. Identifying themselves as the world’s largest developing 
countries, India and China are facing similar problems and challenges. For 
example, India and China have broadly similar expectations and reservations 
towards the WTO and other international trading regimes. Both countries’ 
accommodation of the Uruguay Round (and to the resultant creation of the WTO) 
has focused on broadly similar issues – technical verification problems and phase-
in arrangements of considerable complexity.36 India and China both have Islamic 
extremist and separatist challenges at home. Hence, anti-terrorism is a common 
concern and a mutual commitment. On the issue of energy supplies, both countries 
are facing a growing discrepancy between demand and domestic supply. Their 
demands on foreign oil and other energy resources are increasing rapidly and have 
inevitably led to competition. Both have to adjust their policies to find solutions to 
increasing energy insecurity. Both have realized that a cooperative relationship 
between India and China on energy issues can avoid costly competition over 
energy assets abroad. Such commonalities and complementarities in their 
relationship have constituted a shared interests in cooperation in the new era and 
brought new momentum to the border negotiations in the form of political 
parameters and guiding principles for the settlement of the border question and the 
opening of Border Trade in Nathula. 
 
                                                 
36 See Clad (2004), p. 269. 
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BORDER TRADE IN NATHULA AND THE QINGHAI-TIBET RAILWAY 
 
The border trade between India and China is a further issue I would like to focus 
on. The direct outcome for expanding border trade is to bring peace and economic 
development between the communities in the border regions. Furthermore, the free 
flow of both goods and people across borders should expand mutual transparency 
and thus solidify mutual confidence in their disputed border regions. Through 
people-to-people contact in the trade transactions, mutual confidence between India 
and China ought to be strengthened. In addition, the border trade has also greatly 
facilitated better and cost-effective border management activities by the personnel 
deployed from both sides in the border regions. Thus, border trade can be seen as a 
possible tool for facilitating the resolution of the border question.37  
During Vajpayee’s visit to China in 2003, nine Memoranda of Understanding 
(MOUs), Executive Programmes and a Protocol were signed, encompassing a wide 
area of facilitation measures to enhance cooperation between India and China. 
Among them was a Memorandum on Expanding Border Trade, which is pursuant 
to the Memorandum on the Resumption of Border Trade signed on 13 December 
1991, and the Protocol on Entry and Exit Procedures for Border Trade signed on 1 
July 1992. Since the 1991 Memorandum on Border Trade, two routes via Shipki La 
near Simla and Lipulekh La near the western Nepal-India border have been 
opened. The opening of these two routes is primarily aimed at enabling pilgrims to 
reach two Hindu religious sites, Kailash and Mansarova.38 They remain active only 
between June and September because of bad weather. Hence, they have little 
significance for trade and commerce, and the infrastructure development has 
remained negligible. Nevertheless, the opening of these routes has made a huge 
difference to the lives of people living in the Himalayan region.39 In the new 
Memorandum of 2003, India and China agreed to designate Changgu of Sikkim 
state, and Renqinggang of the Tibet Autonomous Region as the venue for border 
trade market. They also specified the desire to open Nathula in Sikkim as the pass 
for entry and exit of persons, means of transport and commodities engaged in 
border trade. 
Nathula has historically been Tibet’s life-line to the outside world as it is a 
part of the famed “Silk Road” (see Map 2). The trade route through Nathula has a 
better infrastructure and is expected to remain open throughout the year. Until the 
1962 War, traffic across the Nathula Pass accounted for 80 per cent of the total 
border trade volume between the two countries. Since 2003, negotiations on border 
trade in Nathula have been held. The reopening of the Nathula pass was set for 6 
July 2006. This decision has symbolic significance. It establishes firmly China’s 
recognition of Sikkim as a part of India,40 and because the trade through Nathula 
was suspended since the 1962 war, the re-opening of Nathula is a weighty addition 
in a series of CBMs that the neighbours had embarked on in recent years. The 
                                                 
37 See Singh (2005), p. 123. 
38 See Singh (2005), p. 124. 
39 See Mansingh (2005). 
40 China had not recognized Sikkim as an Indian state.  
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Sikkim State Government on the Indian side is predicting that by 2010, the total 
trade across Nathula could be worth as much as $1 billion.41 Most observers might 
find the figure a little ambitious, but considering that China opened the Qinghai-
Tibet railway on 1 July 2006 and plans to extend the railway from Lhasa to 
Yadong42 near the Nathula pass, it is still possible to reach this figure. The 
Qinghai-Tibet Railway will not only link Tibet with other parts of China, but also 
boost border trade. The new railway will turn Tibet into the frontier for southern 
Asian economic communication. India is also predicting a tourist boom for the 
reopened border and the Qinghai-Tibet Railway. It will provide a direct route 
between the former Himalayan kingdoms of Tibet and Sikkim, and will allow 
tourists to travel directly from Tibet to the great Buddhist shrines in Bihar, India.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         Map 2 Nathula Pass and Border Trade Point [Singh (2004), p. 126] 
 
       The border trade and the new railway will connect south western China and 
north eastern India – both are underdeveloped compared with other regions in the 
two countries. The enormous chances brought by the border trade and the railway, 
and the increasing desire to invest in each others’ markets have helped put aside the 
decadesold issue of the border question and, instead, trade and economic 
cooperation are emerging in the foreground. 
 
RIPENESS OF AN ULTIMATE SETTLEMENT? 
 
The border negotiation has taken India and China more than 25 years and has not 
been resolved yet. Some might criticize the tardiness of the negotiating process, 
particularly if attention is focused on the issues related to the border and the 
                                                 
41 See Mansingh (2005).  
42 Yadong is 300 kilometers from Bhutan’s capital city Thimphu, and 600 kilometers from 
Dacca, capital of Bangaladesh. Among other border ports in Tibet, Yadong is the nearest to 
the sea. 
H E I D E L B E R G  P A P E R S  I N  S O U T H  A S I A N  A N D  C O M P A R A T I V E  
P O L I T I C S  
h t t p : / / w w w . s a i . u n i - h e i d e l b e r g . d e / S A P O L / H P S A C P . h t m  
W o r k i n g  P a p e r  N o .  3 1 ,  A u g u s t  2 0 0 7  
 
16 
         YANG LU 
progress made in other bilateral fields is ignored. Nevertheless, the foremost 
achievement lies in the negotiation process itself; that the two parties have finally 
been able to use negotiation to solve an existing dispute following a hiatus of two 
decades after the 1962 disaster.  
In recent years, Sino-Indian relations have entered a new stage of overall 
development. In this context, it is worth asking whether the time is now ripe for a 
final settlement of the border dispute? In the following I will attempt to explore this 
possibility and the potential form of a final settlement. There are three alternative 
approaches evolved in the past decades: (1) No concessions, with an attempt to 
impose one’s will upon the other; (2) Mutual concessions, with demands that the 
other surrender more; and (3) Accept the LAC as the first step towards the final 
settlement.43 The first approach was reflected in the conflict escalation stage. I will 
focus on the last two approaches which are more relevant to the present conflict de-
escalation stage.  
Throughout the 1980s neither government was politically prepared to settle 
the border dispute, nor did they feel any urgency to resolve it. Reflected in the 
negotiations, both adopted the second approach. At the beginning China offered a 
package deal, which implied the “East- West swap.”44 The Indian side hesitated to 
accept it. India’s position was to ensure the McMahon Line as the boundary line in 
the eastern sector, while attempting to get a sizable piece of territory in the western 
sector. When India asked China to explain the proposal of package deal, China’s 
position was not the straightforward “East-West swap” which Indian had expected. 
China’s motivation was to ensure the LAC as the boundary in the western sector 
while demanding that India surrender part of the Tawang Tract in the eastern 
sector. Another source of trouble was the geographical complexity and the 
ambiguity of the current LAC. Without clarification there is the danger of violating 
the LAC, which can lead to military confrontation like that of the Sumdurong Chu 
crisis in 1986. The third approach regards the clarification of LAC as the first step 
toward a final settlement, and agrees to settle the border politically. The Sino-
Indian agreements signed in 1993 and 1996 for clarification and demilitarization of 
the LAC were the first steps towards this process. Although they still need some 
time to delineate the LAC, reduce military forces, and establish CBMs, the two 
Asian giants have found an agreed line to respect and observe. 
Since the establishment of the Special Representatives’ meeting both sides 
have now constructed a three-tiered structure to deal with the sensitive border 
                                                 
43 See Liu (1994), p. 172. 
44 The so-called “package deal” suggested swapping the eastern sector for the western 
sector. In fact, it was an old proposal of Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in 1960. As Atal 
Bihari Vajpayee as Indian Foreign Minister visited China in 1977, he and Chinese leader 
Deng Xiaoping discussed the border issue. During their talk, Deng suggested the “East-
West swap” again and expressed it more explicitly. He elaborated that India had areas 
under its control which were rich in natural resources, whereas China had an area that was 
not economically useful, it would be advisable to have a comprehensive solution on the 
basis of give-and-take. See Ranganathan &Khanna (2000), p. 166. Now the package deal 
has become one of the political parameters and guiding principles of the boundary 
settlement. See The Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles (April 11, 
2005).  
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issue. At the top are leaders of the two countries who have decided to provide the 
impetus and impart the requisite dynamism; next are the Special Representatives 
who will oversee and steer the overall negotiations; and the Joint Working Groups, 
comprising bureaucrats, officials, experts of various sorts, technical personnel, 
specialists and other representative groups who will engage in the discussions.45 
The end solution will be a political and package settlement prescribed by the 
Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles of 2005. The LAC 
is only a temporary line by definition, and because the settlement will be a political 
settlement, the final boundary may be different from the current LAC. A package 
settlement has two possibilities: that China accept the McMahon Line as the basis 
of defining the Sino-Indian boundary in the eastern sector in return for India’s 
recognition of China’s control of Aksai Chin in the western sector, or that mutual 
adjustments are made in each sector, namely, that India would make concessions in 
the eastern sector in return for which China would make concessions in the western 
sector. 
Set in the context of the Sino-Indian relationship at present, the tendency of 
the border negotiations is positive. Nevertheless, there are still impediments to 
reaching a complete settlement. One impediment is India’s 1962 parliamentary 
resolution.46 At the height of the border conflict, on 14 November 1962, the Indian 
Parliament passed a unanimous resolution stating that India will recover every inch 
of territory lost to the Chinese. Hence, the concession of Aksai Chin would mean a 
sell-out of India’s national integrity because of this parliamentary resolution, which 
has never been invoked nor repealed.47 Efforts on the part of the Indian 
Government are still needed to encourage public opinion in favour of a border 
settlement and to disregard the 1962 Parliamentary resolution. The difficulty of the 
Chinese Government lies in the Tawang Tract. Because it is the birth place of the 
6th Dalai Lama, and until 1951 was under the control of the Tibetan monastery, the 
Chinese Government regards it as a centre of Tibetan Buddhism. China has 
claimed that the 90,000 square kilometre territory in the eastern sector south of the 
McMahon Line is Chinese territory. Together with the sensitivity of Tibet, China 
would like to regain Tawang to appease Tibetan and domestic nationalist feelings. 
However, the Indian Government would not concede the territory with its resident 
population. In addition, Article 7 in the Agreement on Political Parameters and 
Guiding Principles that “the two sides shall safeguard due interests of their settled 
populations in the border areas” is also not a favourable condition for the Chinese 
interests in this respect. 
After more than twenty years of negotiations through the efforts of political 
leaders, officials and military and diplomatic experts, there should not be many 
technical problems left. Now the key point is whether the political leaders of India 
and China have enough political will and determination to resolve the pending 
border dispute. Negotiation is a game of give and take. Within the framework of 
the present political parameters and guiding principles, if one side hopes to get a 
                                                 
45 See Acharya (2005), p. 321. 
46 See Maxwell (1970), Liu (1994), Mansigh (2005). 
47 See Mansingh (2005). 
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piece of land from the other, it should offer a proper piece of land to the other. 
From a historical perspective, there is no winner or loser in the whole dispute, both 
have won and have lost in different respects. In fact, at the end each side will get 
essentially what it possesses based on the LAC, without much gain or loss. If the 
politicians of both countries can look beyond the border, they will see that a 
peaceful and settled boundary between the two largest neighbouring nations in 
Asia will bring inestimable benefits to their national security, political stability and 
economic development. Both sides will benefit much more in the future than they 
suppose to lose at present.48 According to the “ripeness” concept of William 
Zartman, perception is the most important factor to impel progress in negotiation 
process, hence, we now need a “sense of a way out” in the perception of leaders of 
India and China for an ultimate settlement. It is time to test the wisdom of the 
political leaders in how they exercise the principle of give-and-take to find a 
mutually acceptable solution, while taking into account the interests of the two 
nations and the popular sentiment of the two peoples. 
 
CONCLUSION:  
BUILDING MUTUAL TRUST THROUGH INSTITUTION-BUILDING 
 
Since the 1950s, the border dispute has been closely linked to bilateral relations 
between India and China. It undermined cooperation between the two countries in 
the early phase of independent statehood. The consequences of the conflict in 1962 
have affected their relations ever since. In recent years, the border issue has 
become relatively less important as the two countries have concentrated on other 
aspects of their bilateral relations such as trade, energy, and even military ties, yet 
an unresolved border dispute could have a destabilising effect on bilateral relations. 
Furthermore, it will hamper joint efforts of counter-terrorism or military exercises 
in the border areas and the extension of border trade on a full-scale. The resolution 
of the border dispute is a key point in building the requisite trust for a stable 
strategic partnership49 between India and China. Unless China and India can 
clearly demarcate their border, any numbers of copies of the bilateral Sino-Indian 
border memorandum will not expel the ghosts of the 1962 war. 
For a long time, many analyses of Sino-Indian relations assumed an 
underlying element of competitiveness, if not down right rivalry, due to the 1962 
conflict and the Cold War between India and China thereafter.50 However, as a 
number of structural and historical conditions have changed, the future bilateral 
relationship need not necessarily be marked by competition and conflict. 
                                                 
48 See Liu (1994), p. 181. 
49 See The 2005 Joint Statement and the Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding 
Principles for the Settlement of the Border Question (April 11, 2005). Compared to the 
Declaration of 2003 between the two Governments, the most significant move in the Joint 
Statement of 2005 is the way in which they describe the relationship which they are 
committed to develop. In the 2003 Declaration, the relationship was described as “a long-
term constructive and cooperative partnership.” In the 2005 Joint Statement it was elevated 
to “an India-China Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity.” 
50  See Garver (2001), Ganguly (2004). 
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Objectively speaking, at present there is competition as well as cooperation 
between the two countries, depending on the areas concerned. Competition is not 
necessary negative, it can be positive. While competition may be inevitable 
between India and China in many areas, conflict is avoidable. Today we can expect 
a more friendly Indo-China relationship based on their steadily widening common 
interests. Each is taking advantage of the opportunities brought about by 
globalization for national economic development, whilst also facing challenges. In 
the course of their development they can learn from each other’s experiences, 
either negative or positive, to formulate policies appropriate to their own 
conditions. The most powerful drive of amicability between India and China at 
present is their economic relations, strengthened by the integration of the global 
economy. Bilateral trade, which started at an extremely low level, reached $18 
billion in 2005, and continues to growing at a high speed. In 1999, the bilateral 
trade volume was still less than $2 billion, now China is India’s third largest trade 
partner. The target of $30 billion set for 2010 is now expected to be reached by 
2008.51 This development shows more optimism and promise for the near future in 
terms of mutual economic dependence.  
At present the main challenge for a strategic relationship to emerge between 
India and China lies in the insufficient trust, particularly in the sensitive area of 
security. The 1962 conflict enlarged India’s threat perception about China. Such 
perceptions can be highlighted by the example of the Indian Government 
disallowing Hong Kong-based Hutchison Port Holdings (HPH), from bidding for 
projects in Mumbai and Chennai ports in 2006.52 With the Western Naval 
Command’s presence there, the Mumbai port was seen as extremely sensitive. The 
Intelligence Bureau, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and the Defence 
Ministry warned that allowing the bidders would give China access to the Indian 
Ocean with serious consequences for Indian maritime security. Allowing the 
company to develop the Mumbai port would give it an operational base in the port 
area and allow it a commanding position from which to collect strategic 
information. In the context of globalization, it is clear that a country’s economic 
development cannot be separated from international cooperation. The intelligence 
agencies may overstate the fears regarding Chinese companies. Since the Indian 
Government could still decide otherwise considering the commercial and 
infrastructural needs, this occurrence reflects not only the fact that India is still 
deeply wary of China, but also the fact that the mindset of threat still has a deep 
impact on India’s policies towards China.  
How can India and China avoid the threat perception in order to develop a 
more trusting relationship? Now various institutions have been established aimed at 
facilitating bilateral relations. For example, Foreign Ministers meet annually; 
contacts between officials and experts are increasing through various Joint 
                                                 
51 See http://www.newkerala.com/news3.php?action=fullnews&id=20582, “India, China 
Trade to Surpass $20 Billon before 2008,” Online Newspaper: New Kerala (July 10, 2006).  
52 See http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1779280.cms, “Chinese firms may be 
barred from port race,” by Subodh Ghildiyal, Times of India (online edition, July 20th, 
2006).  
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Working Groups such as the Joint Economic Group (JEG), the Joint Study Group 
(JSG) and regular strategic dialogues. The achievements in bilateral relations so far 
can be attributed to the work of these institutions. Hence, I would argue that 
institution-building will continue to strengthen exchanges, mutual understanding, 
and trust between the two countries.  
           For bilateral relations institution-building at the bilateral level is obvious. 
Yet institution-building can also take place at the multilateral level. In fact, 
bilateral relations cannot be separated from a multilateral context, as was the case 
with the Cold War structure, when Indo-China relations were complicated by their 
respective relationships with Pakistan and the Soviet Union. Even the border 
dispute between India and China was not a purely bilateral issue. It involved not 
only India and China as the main actors, but also Britain, Russia, Tibet at its very 
beginning, and later Pakistan, the Soviet Union, as well as other common 
neighbours of India and China. In today’s world system, multilateral cooperation is 
of increasing importance, particularly because both India and China are promoting 
multi-polarity. Their multilateral cooperation can proceed through their 
participation in multilateral regimes, particularly at the regional level, such as the 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation (SCO) or the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC). Multilateral regimes are platforms for dialogue among nations as well 
as tools for checks and balances between them. Therefore, problems that India and 
China can not solve through bilateral channels may be raised to a multilateral level 
as a means of seeking a solution through the participation of other countries. In this 
sense, participation in various multilateral regimes may hold a better prospect for 
Sino-Indian relations in the future. In order to push the development of multilateral 
regimes forward, China and India need to accommodate to each other, making 
concessions in some issues to benefit from others. Another crucial point is that, 
constrained by a multilateral framework, they will need to appeal rather to peaceful 
means such as negotiation and mediation than to the use of force to solve their 
conflicts and problems. Now, at least at a governmental level, both sides have 
realized the importance of multilateral cooperation and have “supported 
multilateral cooperation in Asia, believing that such cooperation promotes mutual 
beneficial exchanges, economic growth as well as greater cohesion among Asian 
countries.” At the same time, “the two sides viewed positively each others’ 
participation in regional and sub-regional multilateral cooperation process in 
Asia.”53 Hence, we have reason to expect that India and China will, through 
bilateral as well as multilateral channels, learn from each other, understand each 
other,54 and thus, build trusting and peaceful relations, which are crucial for the 
welfare and prosperity of Asia and the world.  
                                                 
53 The Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation between 
the Republich of India and the People’s Republic of China (June 23, 2003).  
54 Nye (1987) introduced distinction between simple learning (behavioural effects) and 
complex learning (constructive effects on identities and interests). Learning or “Cognitive 
Evolution” is also crucial aspect of Constructivist approaches; it is “the process of 
innovation, domestic and international diffusion, political selection and effective 
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